In their own words, six junior soldiers describe why they joined the U.S. Army, their joys and frustrations, and what they hope the future brings. These stories offer lessons for policymakers, Army leaders and recruiters, and anyone considering a career in the Army.
The authors assess the relative importance of component status relative to a number of potential determinants of operational effectiveness, including but not limited to unit type, training level, experience in country, and associated costs and risk.
This report examines how changing the way in which the Army executes mobilization and contingency planning can affect the ratio of reserve component to active component units deploying in the early weeks of a major crisis.
Analysis of the new Blended Retirement System (BRS) finds that it can sustain U.S. Army Reserve participation relative to the legacy system. The analysis also predicts continuation-pay cost and the percentage of reservists opting in to the BRS.
A new framework for assessing the maturity of knowledge products (outputs from health science research) assigns each product to a knowledge readiness level, to help the U.S. Army make better decisions about its health science research portfolio.
The U.S. Army recognizes that the recruiting environment has a significant impact on its ability to recruit. This report presents a forecasting model that measures recruiting difficulty to forecast a difficult or easy recruiting environment.
The U.S. Army uses virtual systems for collective skills training. This report examines the needs for fidelity in simulators and associated costs to support effective and efficient collective training.
The personalities of U.S. military services are alive and well. Their unique cultures impact how they compete for resources, authorities, access, and influence. And their competition on the bureaucratic battlefield changes as the environment changes. How might the services react to a sudden change in resource levels or region of focus?
The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act required an evaluation of the Corporation for the Promotion of Rifle Practice and Firearms Safety and its Civilian Marksmanship Program. This report summarizes the RAND Arroyo Center evaluation.
Russia has a range of tools and methods short of conventional war that it can use to achieve its goals in Europe. There is no way to predict what Russia will do, but it's possible to analyze its motives and opportunities, the means it might employ, and how the United States should respond.
In this Perspective, the authors seek to provide criteria for an effective and efficient Army for the 21st century and lay out principles to help guide leaders in making contemporary force-planning decisions.
Quality of life for soldiers on contingency bases is key for morale and physical and emotional well-being but also a substantial logistics burden. This report evaluates factors that contribute to and detract from soldier quality of life.
History records the names of generals, not of the privates filling out supply forms, cleaning out trucks, or huffing through another training exercise. But those privates keep the U.S. Army running. RAND research provides their unfiltered take on life in the ranks.
This report examines what the career of a "typical" Army civilian looks like. It identifies seven common career patterns among individuals who entered the Army civilian workforce between 1981 and 2000 as General Schedule employees.
This report examines U.S. Army security cooperation (SC) processes in the Pacific Command area of responsibility to forge stronger links between strategic and tactical levels in the planning and execution of SC activities.
The primary mission of U.S. Army noncommissioned officers is to lead and mentor soldiers. But research has placed little emphasis on how to value their experience. Knowing how NCOs influence soldiers can help the Army maintain or improve leadership quality and soldier performance and reduce personnel costs.
Will to fight is vital to understanding war, but it is often ignored or misunderstood. A model of unit will to fight that can be applied to ground combat units of any scale can help U.S. military leaders better assess partner and adversary forces and incorporate will to fight in their planning.
When considering threats from Russia and North Korea, it is natural to focus on military capabilities. But incorporating will to fight into the analysis of actual or potential conflicts will enhance strategic planning. A model that can be tailored and applied to various conflict scenarios can help U.S. leaders better understand and influence will to fight.