Gian Gentile

Associate Director, RAND Arroyo Center; Senior Historian

Washington Office

Education

Ph.D. in history, Stanford University

One Page Bio

Overview

Gian Gentile is the associate director of RAND Arroyo Center, the United States Army's sole federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis. Gentile is also a senior historian at the RAND Corporation. His research focuses on U.S. Army total force policy, military doctrine and organization, history, innovation and transformation, and strategy. Gentile completed 32 years of active service in the U.S. Army where he served in a variety of command and staff assignments in the United States, Korea, and Europe. Prior to his time at RAND, he was Director of the Military History Program at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Gentile did two combat tours in Iraq: In 2003 he was a Brigade Combat Team Executive Officer in the 4th Infantry Division in Tikrit, and in 2006 he commanded a cavalry squadron in the 4th Infantry Division in west Baghdad. His latest book, Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency, was released by The New Press in June 2013. He has also published widely in professional and scholarly journals, and in major national and international media. He has been a visiting fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. For his work at RAND on issues relating to the proper mix between the Active and Reserve Army Components, Gentile was awarded the Bronze and Silver Medals for excellence in research and writing.

Research Focus

Commentary

Ukraine

What's the Harm in Talking to Russia? A Lot, Actually
Despite the way it is commonly portrayed, diplomacy is not intrinsically and always good, nor is it cost-free. In the Ukraine conflict, the problems with a push for diplomacy are especially apparent. The likely benefits of negotiations are minimal, and the prospective costs could be significant.
Nov 22, 2022
Foreign Policy
Military Strategy

'Wonder Weapons' Will Not Win Russia's War
With its army increasingly in shambles, Russia has turned to attacking Ukraine's civilian infrastructure with Iranian-made drones in an effort to destroy Ukrainians' will to fight. These tactics will inflict pain on the Ukrainian population, but if history is any guide, they will not forestall a Russian defeat.
Nov 10, 2022
Defense One
Military Strategy

David E. Johnson: A Remembrance
On October 30th, David E. Johnson, Col U.S. Army (retired), a principal researcher at RAND and a leading intellectual in national defense and military history, passed away following a long illness. His deep knowledge of military history provided a perspective to analyze problems and make sound policy recommendations that were valued by senior decisionmakers in the Army and elsewhere.
Nov 10, 2022
The RAND Blog
Threat Assessment

Why Putin's Nuclear Gambit Is a Huge Mistake
Russia is losing in Ukraine, and the rhetoric of Russian leaders has recently become ever more apocalyptic. The United States and its allies should be prepared in case Russia goes down the nuclear path, but fear should not drive the Western response to Russia's nuclear bluster.
Oct 19, 2022
Foreign Policy
Ukraine

A Moment of Strategic Clarity
With the Russian mobilization and declared annexation, whatever prospects there were for a negotiated peace seem to have all but vanished. Any result short of Ukrainian victory will be, in the long run, a worse outcome for the rules-based international order.
Oct 3, 2022
Lawfare
Ukraine

Ukraine's 1777 Moment
The Battle of Saratoga turned the tides of the Revolutionary War, ultimately leading to American independence. Nearly 250 years later, the Battle of Kharkiv may be a similar turning point in Ukraine's fight against Russia.
Sep 19, 2022
Foreign Policy
Ukraine

The Case for Cautious Optimism in Ukraine
While the outcome of the war in Ukraine is by no means clear, the balance of materiel, manpower, and willpower all seem to make the case for cautious optimism. Although Ukraine is unlikely to throw Russia back to its borders any time soon, the war will likely trend in Ukraine's favor in the coming months. But only if the West does not blink first.
Aug 9, 2022
Foreign Policy
Military Strategy

The Lessons the United States Learned, and That Russia Did Not
As dissimilar as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars may be to the war in Ukraine, those conflicts taught the United States a few important lessons, often the hard way. As a result, the U.S. military probably would have avoided the problems that beset the Russians in Ukraine—not in spite of the global war on terrorism, but because of it.
Jul 25, 2022
Lawfare
Russia

Russia, Ukraine, and the Misuse of History
History as playbook has been used to paint the Ukraine conflict as the start of a larger battle for Europe. But even if it is Putin's intent to knock over one domino of a European country after another, the Russian Army—unlike the Soviet Army of old—simply does not have the capacity to do that.
Apr 6, 2022
Defense One
The Realities of Civil War
Civil war is not a pretty thing to see or be a part of. Those understandably engaged with the intense debate over whether or not the president should be impeached should not suggest that impeachment would result in civil war in our country. There are peaceful means available for us as Americans to follow in order to solve the problems at hand.
Oct 9, 2019
The National Interest
North Korea

The Hidden Components of the North Korean Military Challenge
In an era of global competition in which U.S. military resources are stretched thin, the United States should consider looking for opportunities to scale back potential overcommitment. The current inter-Korean dialogue presents such an opportunity.
Mar 12, 2019
The National Interest
Operational Readiness

The Tension Between What the Army Is and What It Does
Cooperation and integration of the Army's three components is important, but what's most important is effectiveness in war and the key to that is trained, properly organized, and ready forces.
Mar 3, 2016
The National Interest
Military Force Planning

Understanding the Abrams Doctrine: Myth Versus Reality
As the NCFA finishes up its work on the future of the Army it is worthwhile to note that the strategic context in which the Army operates and is organized has changed over time, resulting in different calculations of costs and risks.
Dec 9, 2015
War on the Rocks
Operational Readiness

The U.S. Army Must Remain Prepared for Battle
Converting the Army into a force suited only for homeland defense or humanitarian missions abroad, without the ability to fight sophisticated foes as part of a joint force, would result in an unprepared Army.
Apr 18, 2014
The Washington Post

Publications

Report
Operation Inherent Resolve: U.S. Ground Force Contributions
This report, which outlines four battles within Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) and reviews U.S. ground force contributions to those battles, is intended to address gaps both in analysis and in the common understanding of OIR.
Oct 17, 2022
Report
A History of the Third Offset, 2014–2018
The authors describe the Third Offset -- a U.S. strategy centered on the potential of technology to offset Chinese and Russian military advances and that shaped the 2018 National Defense Strategy -- focusing on efforts to effect institutional change.
Mar 31, 2021
Report
North Korean Decisionmaking: Economic Opening, Conventional Deterrence Breakdown, and Nuclear Use
The authors examine (1) experiences of different communist regimes to forecast North Korean adoption of a new economic model; (2) what might happen if conventional deterrence fails on the Peninsula; and (3) why North Korea might use nuclear weapons.
Aug 20, 2020
Report
North Korean Conventional Artillery: A Means to Retaliate, Coerce, Deter, or Terrorize Populations
A series of visualizations brings into sharp relief the threat posed by the massive numbers of North Korean conventional artillery systems that are within range of major South Korean population centers.
Aug 6, 2020
Tool
A History of U.S. Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present: A Path to Army Total Force Policy
The authors show that there is no such thing as a traditional U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940.
Jun 23, 2020
Report
The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present, Volume I: The Old Regime: The Army, Militia, and Volunteers from Colonial Times to the Spanish-American War
The authors show that there is no such thing as a "traditional" U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940.
Jun 23, 2020
Report
The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present, Volume II: The Formative Years for U.S. Military Policy, 1898–1940
The authors show that there is no such thing as a "traditional" U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940.
Jun 23, 2020
Report
The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present, Volume IV: The Total Force Policy Era, 1970–2015
The authors show that there is no such thing as a "traditional" U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940.
Jun 23, 2020
Research Brief
The Battle for Baghdad: Institutionalizing Army Lessons for Urban Combat
This brief recounts the U.S. Army's efforts in the Iraq War, especially in Baghdad, and offers lessons learned and recommendations to enable leaders and soldiers to be better prepared in future conflicts.
Jul 3, 2019
Report
The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned — And Still to Be Learned
To help the U.S. Army and U.S. Department of Defense retain institutional knowledge and fully prepare future leaders, RAND researchers recount the Army's efforts in the Iraq War, especially in Baghdad, and offer lessons learned and recommendations.
Jun 12, 2019
Tool
Four Problems on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea's Expanding Nuclear Capabilities Drive a Complex Set of Problems
This toolkit provides visualizations illuminating four Korea-related problems: North Korea's nuclear arsenal, North Korean artillery systems, evacuating South Korean population centers, and securing North Korean nuclear weapons and facilities.
Jan 11, 2019
Report
Planning an Army for the 21st Century: Principles to Guide U.S. Army Force Size, Mix, and Component Distribution
In this Perspective, the authors seek to provide criteria for an effective and efficient Army for the 21st century and lay out principles to help guide leaders in making contemporary force-planning decisions.
Dec 3, 2018
Report
The Korean Peninsula: Three Dangerous Scenarios
This perspective summarizes the findings of three major RAND studies on security challenges on the Korean Peninsula.
May 30, 2018
Report
Sustaining the Army's Reserve Components as an Operational Force
This report identifies emerging policy lessons regarding the use of, and reforms to, the U.S. Army's Reserve Components (RCs) as an operational reserve derived from analyses of their contributions to recent contingency operations.
Jun 12, 2017
Report
The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present
This report traces how U.S. military policy has evolved through statutory changes and legislative compromises. Today's "traditional" military policy dates back only to 1940. This history provides context for further evolving the U.S. Army.
May 4, 2017
Report
Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army: How the Past Can Inform the Present and Future
Provides a historical analysis of how militaries have deployed light and mechanized infantry with armored forces during close urban combat, to identify the comparative advantages and costs of this warfighting approach and lessons learned.
Mar 13, 2017