This 1970 analysis of pacification organization and management in South Vietnam is believed to be the first comprehensive systematic treatment of the pacification program. It evolved from a three-day seminar at RAND in November 1969, which included an extensive question-and-answer session with two U.S. Army historians who are doing the official history of the Vietnam War. The paper concentrates on the organization and management of this essentially Vietnamese (even if largely U.S.-sponsored) pacification effort — a unique large-scale experiment in how to cope with insurgency war. It is designed as a contribution to a RAND analysis under ARPA auspices of U.S. government organization and performance in counterinsurgency war.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Document series. The RAND Document (D), a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1970, was an internal working paper written as a step in a continuing study within RAND, which could be expanded, modified, or withdrawn at any time.
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