In this issue paper, the author examines how--prior to Yugoslavia and in other, future cases--the United States might deter the behavior that has produced such atrocities or compel its cessation once begun. He argues that effective deterrence or compellence requires a decision, clear in advance to the enemy, to escalate, if necessary, several steps beyond the step currently taken. Without such a clear decision, any attempt at deterrence/compellence is likely to be no more than the futile gesture that remains our only option in Yugoslavia. Issues affecting such a decision are whether to act multi- or unilaterally, whether there are pressure points for effective deterrence, and how to address the morality of civilian deaths inherent in escalation.
Levine, Robert A., If It's Worth Doing at All, Is It Worth Doing Wrong? Yugoslavia and the Next Time. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993. https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP129.html.
Levine, Robert A., If It's Worth Doing at All, Is It Worth Doing Wrong? Yugoslavia and the Next Time, RAND Corporation, IP-129, 1993. As of December 7, 2023: https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP129.html