If It's Worth Doing at All, Is It Worth Doing Wrong?

Yugoslavia and the Next Time

Robert A. Levine

ResearchPublished 1993

In this issue paper, the author examines how--prior to Yugoslavia and in other, future cases--the United States might deter the behavior that has produced such atrocities or compel its cessation once begun. He argues that effective deterrence or compellence requires a decision, clear in advance to the enemy, to escalate, if necessary, several steps beyond the step currently taken. Without such a clear decision, any attempt at deterrence/compellence is likely to be no more than the futile gesture that remains our only option in Yugoslavia. Issues affecting such a decision are whether to act multi- or unilaterally, whether there are pressure points for effective deterrence, and how to address the morality of civilian deaths inherent in escalation.

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Document Details

  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Web-Only
  • Year: 1993
  • Paperback Pages: 5
  • Document Number: IP-129

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Levine, Robert A., If It's Worth Doing at All, Is It Worth Doing Wrong? Yugoslavia and the Next Time, RAND Corporation, IP-129, 1993. As of September 11, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP129.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Levine, Robert A., If It's Worth Doing at All, Is It Worth Doing Wrong? Yugoslavia and the Next Time. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993. https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP129.html.
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