Commitment to Purpose
How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War
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This book presents an in-depth historical analysis of how the Cold War unfolded in Europe from 1946-1992. It focuses on the NATO-Warsaw Pact military confrontation, but it views this confrontation in the larger framework of security policies and East-West diplomacy on both sides. Its thesis is that the West won the Cold War because it not only forged the NATO military alliance, but also learned how to make this alliance work by mastering the art of peacetime coalition planning. The effect was to keep Western Europe secure, thereby allowing the West’s superior economic performance and political cohesion to overshadow the rival Soviet-led bloc. A further thesis is that the western alliance should be kept alive in order to deal with new problems on Europe’s horizon. The book includes a foreword by Robert Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Table of Contents
Section 1: Introduction
Chapter One
Scope and Methods
Section 2: Laying the Foundations: The 1940s and 1950s
Chapter Two
Origins of the Cold War
Chapter Three
Military Buildup
Chapter Four
Nuclear Interlude
Section 3: The Great Strategy Debate: The 1960s
Chapter Five
Revolution in American Military Strategy
Chapter Six
The Debate Erupts
Chapter Seven
The Search for Solutions
Chapter Eight
Toward a New NATO Military Strategy
Chapter Nine
NATO Force Trends: The Uneven Path to Progress
Chapter Ten
Alliance Decay or Growth?
Section 4: Ambiguous Competition and Growing Resolve: The 1970s
Chapter Eleven
U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy in the Nixon Administration
Chapter Twelve
The Tangled Web of NATO Defense Planning and Détente Diplomacy in Europe
Chapter Thirteen
Toward Reawakened Interest in Defense Policy
Chapter Fourteen
NATO Policy in Carter’s Early Years
Chapter Fifteen
NATO Policy in Carter’s Last Years
Chapter Sixteen
Legacy of the 1970s: A Decade of Neglect?
Section 5: Strategic Resurgence and Sudden Victory: The 1980s
Chapter Seventeen
The Reagan Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy
Chapter Eighteen
INF Modernization in Europe
Chapter Nineteen
Toward NATO Conventional Force Improvements
Chapter Twenty
Toward a Safer Europe: 1985-88
Chapter Twenty-One
The European Military Balance in Historical Perspective
Chapter Twenty-Two
The End of the Cold War and Start of Something New
Section 6: Lessons of the Past, Policies for the Future
Chapter Twenty-Three
How the Cold War Was Won
Chapter Twenty-Four
Toward a More Political Alliance: Prospects and Problems
Chapter Twenty-Five
Future U.S. Policy in Europe
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