This report discusses the buildup of combat power during Operation Desert Shield based upon the analysis of results of an intensive data collection effort undertaken at the request of the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. This evaluation and data collection activity was initiated and completed while the deployment of forces was under way. This report describes an integrated view of this complex operation as examined by teams of researchers specializing in policy, deployment, operations, command and control, logistics, and manpower and personnel. It focuses on the successes and problems encountered in this unprecedented operation and concludes with a discussion of the implications for future contingency operations.
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