The air campaign conducted by the coalition air forces in the Kuwaiti theater of operations grew and changed emphasis during the various phases of operations. In this report, the author describes the evolution of the campaign and the planning and control of air operations, assesses the effectiveness of various systems employed against the Iraqi ground forces, and discusses the factors that led to success. Among the impressive features of this war was the adaptability of the planning and control system: new operational concepts such as Scud hunting were developed and implemented within a week of conception. Other facets of airpower finally achieved potential: large-scale night air operations were successful for the first time, due to forward-looking imaging infrared sensors, effective munitions, and well-trained people.
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