Conflicting U.S. Objectives in Weapon System Codevelopment: The FS-X Case
Jan 1, 1995
A History of U.S.-Japan Collaboration on the FS-X Fighter
Prefatory Material, Chapters 1 - 5
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Chapters 6 - 10
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Chapter 11 - 13, References & Index
|PDF file||6.4 MB|
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The United States has generally tried to discourage its allies from developing their own major weapons systems, to promote equipment standardization with U.S. forces, and tie allied security policies more firmly to U.S. interests. Japan's FS-X fighter is perhaps the most prominent example of this policy. Japan had originally intended to design and build an indigenous fighter; the Pentagon urged Japan to buy an existing U.S. fighter. After difficult negotiations, the two sides eventually agreed to lightly modify the U.S. F-16 jointly to meet Japan's special needs. But as a result of political controversies over technology transfer and trade, the U.S. side focused increasingly on the economic aspects of the program. Under cover of these controversies, the Japanese have been able to move the FS-X design and technology applications ever farther away from the F-16 toward a much more nearly indigenous creation. In the end, the FS-X program has failed to meet many of the original U.S. expectations, and Japan has reaped an unexpected reward — experience in developing a world-class fighter aircraft. This book presents a history of the program, while a companion volume, MR-612/1-AF, summarizes and assesses the program.
The U.S. Quest for Technology Reciprocity
Japan's Postwar Quest for a National Fighter
Building the Fighter Technology Base
The Battle Joined: Stopping the Rising Sun Fighter
The Struggle over Program Control
The Storm Breaks in Congress
The Showdown over FS-X and Its Aftermath
The Rising Sun Fighter Reborn?
The First Three Years of R&D: Gaining Access to Japanese FS-X Technologies
An Interim Technology Balance Sheet
This book emerged from a RAND research project conducted in the early 1990s on collaboration with Asian allies on military aircraft R&D. The Resource Management and System Acquisition Program of RAND's Project AIR FORCE initiated this research, which was sponsored by the United States Air Force.
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