Journal Article
Strengthening the Shipbuilding Industry
Dec 1, 2013
Force Structure, Cost, Schedule, and Technology Issues for CVN77
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This report documents the methods and findings of RAND research on the adequacy of the defense industrial base to support further construction of aircraft carriers and on the cost, schedule, and technology issues associated with building the next carrier, designated CVN 77. If the current carrier force size of 12 ships is to be maintained and if a decay in the quality of basic capabilities is to be avoided, CVN 77 cannot be started more than a year or so beyond the currently planned date of 2002. The earlier CVN is started, the less it will cost. Increasing the build duration from the planned 6.5 years to 8.5 years will also reduce costs. However, timing should not greatly affect the survival of suppliers of carrier components. The report recommends beginning ship fabrication before 2002 (which could save hundreds of millions of dollars); ordering contractor-furnished equipment in advance of shipyard start (a savings of tens of millions); and investment in R&D directed toward adapting production processes and engineering improvements that could reduce the cost of carrier construction, operation and maintenance, and manning. In fact, the costs involved in building and operating carriers are so huge that the Navy should consider establishing a stable annual R&D funding level for these ships. Appendixes to the report provide supporting data.
Preface
Figures
Tables
Summary
Acknowledgements
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
Aircraft Carriers and the Carrier Industrial Base
Chapter Three
How Force Structure Objectives Constrain Carrier Production Schedules
Chapter Four
How the Cvn 77 Start Date Affects Shipbuilder Cost
Chapter Five
How Cvn 77 Construction Affects Nuclear- Component Vendors
Chapter Six
Issues Related to Suppliers of Nonnuclear Components
Chapter Seven
Research and Development to Save Costs on Future Carriers
Chapter Eight
Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendix A
Carrier Data
Appendix B
Crisis-Response Data, 1950-1996
Appendix C
Carrier Fleets of the World
Appendix D
Components of Shipbuilder Cost Differences
Appendix E
Labor Required for Various Projects at Newportnews Shipbuilding
Appendix F
Large Surface-Ship Production in Great Britain
Appendix G
Issues of Aircraft Carrier Production in France
Appendix H
Cruise-Ship Production at Kvaerner Masa Helsinki New Shipyard
Chapter I
Italian Cruise-Ship Production by Fincantieri
Appendix J
Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carrier Operating and Support Costs
Bibliography
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