The Next Supreme Leader
Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran
ResearchPublished Feb 21, 2011
Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran
ResearchPublished Feb 21, 2011
As the commander in chief and highest political authority in Iran, the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has played a critical role in the direction of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has never been more true than during the tumultuous 2009 presidential elections, the outcome of which was determined by Khamenei's decisive support of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Only two men have held the position of Supreme Leader since the Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979: Khamenei and his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As Khamenei ages and rumors of his ill health intensify, U.S. policymakers and analysts need to consider the various scenarios for succession. The eventual outcome — what the office of the Supreme Leader looks like in Khamenei's wake — will determine the Islamic Republic's direction. The research documented in this monograph identifies three key factors that will shape succession of the next Supreme Leader and outlines five alternative scenarios for the post-Khamenei era. For each of the factors, it provides a set of indicators that observers can use to assess the most important trends. It situates all of this within the context of the June 2009 election. Because the context in which succession would occur becomes more uncertain the further into the future one looks, the authors focus on the near term — i.e., a succession that would take place within the next two to three years. However, the authors also speculate about the changes that are likely to ensue in the longer term if Khamenei remains Supreme Leader for the next ten years or more. In light of the 2009 election, a status quo scenario seems most likely in the near term, and an absolutist scenario is a close second. The likelihood of longer-term succession scenarios is uncertain.
The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
This publication is part of the RAND monograph series. RAND monographs were products of RAND from 2003 to 2011 that presented major research findings that addressed the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs were subjected to rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.