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A Hizballah raid along the Lebanon-Israel border on July 12, 2006, resulted in the capture of two Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and others killed and wounded. The response from Jerusalem was both quick and violent, surprising Hizballah's leadership and triggering the month-long Second Lebanon War. The event left the IDF a chastened force and Israel an introspective nation. The IDF's efforts to learn from the war and correct recognized deficiencies began immediately. This book draws on information provided by serving IDF personnel during a March 2007 conference held in Tel Aviv, interviews with retired IDF officers, and written sources. The analysis first reviews identified shortfalls, then offers an external perspective to provide further thoughts on sources of difficulties and analyze what the conflict offers the U.S. military in the way of lessons that might assist as it confronts operational challenges today and in the future.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction and Background
Chapter Two
Israeli Postwar Analysis and Reaction
Chapter Three
Responding to the Lessons: IDF Reactions in the Aftermath of the Second Lebanon War
Chapter Four
Additional Thoughts Regarding Lessons from the Second Lebanon War
Chapter Five
Revalidations and New Considerations: Implications for the United States and Other Nations
Research conducted by
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Joint Forces Command Joint Urban Operations Office. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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