Download eBook for Free

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.9 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Summary Only

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.1 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

A Hizballah raid along the Lebanon-Israel border on July 12, 2006, resulted in the capture of two Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and others killed and wounded. The response from Jerusalem was both quick and violent, surprising Hizballah's leadership and triggering the month-long Second Lebanon War. The event left the IDF a chastened force and Israel an introspective nation. The IDF's efforts to learn from the war and correct recognized deficiencies began immediately. This book draws on information provided by serving IDF personnel during a March 2007 conference held in Tel Aviv, interviews with retired IDF officers, and written sources. The analysis first reviews identified shortfalls, then offers an external perspective to provide further thoughts on sources of difficulties and analyze what the conflict offers the U.S. military in the way of lessons that might assist as it confronts operational challenges today and in the future.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Introduction and Background

  • Chapter Two

    Israeli Postwar Analysis and Reaction

  • Chapter Three

    Responding to the Lessons: IDF Reactions in the Aftermath of the Second Lebanon War

  • Chapter Four

    Additional Thoughts Regarding Lessons from the Second Lebanon War

  • Chapter Five

    Revalidations and New Considerations: Implications for the United States and Other Nations

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Joint Forces Command Joint Urban Operations Office. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.