Occupying Iraq
A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority
ResearchPublished Apr 20, 2009
The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives — the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from May 2003 to June of the following year. It is based on interviews with many of those responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalists' accounts of the period, and on nearly 100,000 never-before-released CPA documents. The book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, reform the judicial and penal systems, fight corruption, revitalize the economy, and create the basis for representative government. It also addresses the occupation's most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst.
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- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Available
- Year: 2009
- Print Format: Paperback
- Paperback Pages: 410
- Paperback Price: $40.00
- Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-4665-9
- Document Number: MG-847-CC
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Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle, and Siddharth Mohandas, Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority, RAND Corporation, MG-847-CC, 2009. As of October 15, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG847.html
Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Benjamin Runkle, and Siddharth Mohandas, Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG847.html. Also available in print form.
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The research described in this report was sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations.
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