Conversations by the author with Pakistani defense and intelligence officials and Afghan exile sources indicated that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had reached a military stalemate as a result of Soviet tactics and sensitivity to casualties. Despite the fragmented and primitive nature of the opposition, Moscow has no short-term solution for reversing the deterioration of its local Afghan political base. It has several as yet unexploited military options for breaking the back of tribal resistance, such as a full-scale pacification effort, but all would require a substantially higher troop commitment and casualties than the Soviets have at present.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Note series. The note was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1979 to 1993 that reported other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution.
This research in the public interest was supported by RAND, using discretionary funds made possible by the generosity of RAND's donors, the fees earned on client-funded research, and independent research and development (IR&D) funds provided by the Department of Defense.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.