This Note analyzes the workings of the major international agreement (the "gentlemen's agreement") intended to restrict the volume of support subsidies provided through export credit programs. In particular, the Note considers the problem of maintaining discipline among members and the extent to which the agreement is threatened by the growth of nonmember exporters. As a framework for the analysis, it examines the reasons governments operate these export subsidy schemes in light of powerful economic arguments that the same economic goals can be attained more efficiently through other means. Finally, it identifies possible threats to the working of the agreement, and suggests remedies to deal with these threats.
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