The inability of the armed services to accurately forecast their spares requirements has been an ongoing and widespread problem. This Note considers a regression methodology for spares requirements forecasting. It contains a nontechnical description of current forecasting approaches, presents the approach suggested by the authors, and details the methods used to calculate the requirements for the C-5, the F-15, and the F-16 aircraft. The authors conclude that, even after eliminating collections of parts whose costs are difficult to predict, costs for the remainder of the requirements are difficult to predict with the needed accuracy.
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