Although the relationship between defense and the macroeconomy in the Soviet Union has received substantial attention by U.S. government analysts, the effort has not yielded accurate measurements or valid predictions. The basic errors in Western estimates and forecasts have arisen from the acceptance of unreliable physical production data published by official Soviet statistical sources. The author discusses Soviet economic performance, measurement of gross national product and the defense burden, technical problems in analyzing the defense burden in centrally planned economies (CPEs), modeling CPEs and their defense sectors, and Soviet economic reform and the military's role.
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