Possible Postwar Force Requirements for the Persian Gulf

How Little Is Enough?

David A. Shlapak, Paul K. Davis

ResearchPublished 1991

This Note describes a methodology for estimating the force levels that would be needed to defend Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf crisis, and it describes the results of a preliminary analysis performed using the methodology. The analysis suggests that about 3.5 effective equivalent divisions (EEDs; a U.S. armored division equals one EED) of heavy mechanized forces are needed to provide a good chance of successfully defending against an Iraqi attack on the Arabian peninsula; therefore, a militarily useful U.S. presence in the region need not be as large as some have predicted. The authors also suggest that some 150-200 dedicated Air Force and Army aircraft for attack of ground forces must be available on D-day.

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  • Copyright: RAND Corporation
  • Availability: Available
  • Year: 1991
  • Print Format: Paperback
  • Paperback Pages: 45
  • Paperback Price: $23.00
  • Paperback ISBN/EAN: 978-0-8330-1889-2
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/N3314
  • Document Number: N-3314-CENTCOM/JS

Citation

RAND Style Manual
Shlapak, David A. and Paul K. Davis, Possible Postwar Force Requirements for the Persian Gulf: How Little Is Enough? RAND Corporation, N-3314-CENTCOM/JS, 1991. As of September 23, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3314.html
Chicago Manual of Style
Shlapak, David A. and Paul K. Davis, Possible Postwar Force Requirements for the Persian Gulf: How Little Is Enough? Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991. https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3314.html. Also available in print form.
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