Possible Postwar Force Requirements for the Persian Gulf
How Little Is Enough?
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This Note describes a methodology for estimating the force levels that would be needed to defend Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf crisis, and it describes the results of a preliminary analysis performed using the methodology. The analysis suggests that about 3.5 effective equivalent divisions (EEDs; a U.S. armored division equals one EED) of heavy mechanized forces are needed to provide a good chance of successfully defending against an Iraqi attack on the Arabian peninsula; therefore, a militarily useful U.S. presence in the region need not be as large as some have predicted. The authors also suggest that some 150-200 dedicated Air Force and Army aircraft for attack of ground forces must be available on D-day.
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