An Approach to Understanding the Value of Parts
Jan 1, 1994
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This Note investigates management adaptations taken to speed up the repair of jet engines during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Most data were gathered from the engine repair shop at the Naval Aviation Depot in San Diego, CA. Management adaptations fell into two general categories: item oriented and process oriented. The former dealt with specific items in the engine repair process, e.g., compressor blades, and the latter addressed the engine repair process. The authors discovered that material support was a major problem, to include sole suppliers of critical items, failure to stock common commercially available items, poor parts visibility, and slow distribution. The absence of a bill of materials for each engine type inhibited planning. Failure to return inoperative engines and an inability to know what was in the retrograde system point to likely problems for future operations. Finally, both horizontal and vertical communications were particularly helpful in dealing with surge-related problems.
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