Cover: Equilibrium Points in Games with Vector Payoffs

Equilibrium Points in Games with Vector Payoffs

Published 1956

by Lloyd S. Shapley

Purchase Print Copy

 Format Price
Add to Cart Paperback9 pages $15.00

An attempt to define and characterize the equilibrium-point solutions of games with payoffs that sometimes take the form of a vector. It is assumed the vector has components that represent amounts of different things of which the relative values are unknown. A definition and characterization of the equilibrium-point solutions of two-person games in which the payoff takes the form of a vector, the relative values of the components being unknown. (Also published as RAND/RM-1818.)

This report is part of the RAND paper series. The paper was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit

RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.