An attempt to define and characterize the equilibrium-point solutions of games with payoffs that sometimes take the form of a vector. It is assumed the vector has components that represent amounts of different things of which the relative values are unknown. A definition and characterization of the equilibrium-point solutions of two-person games in which the payoff takes the form of a vector, the relative values of the components being unknown. (Also published as RAND/RM-1818.)
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