Equilibrium Points in Games with Vector Payoffs

Lloyd S. Shapley

ResearchPublished 1956

A definition and characterization of the equilibrium-point solutions of two-person games in which the payoff takes the form of a vector, the relative values of the components being unknown. (Also published as P-1212.)

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Shapley, Lloyd S., Equilibrium Points in Games with Vector Payoffs. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1956. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM1818.html.
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