Cover: Two-Person Cooperative Games

Two-Person Cooperative Games

Published 1950

by John F. Nash

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In this paper we shall define the concept of a general two-person cooperative game and develop a concept of a solution for such games. There are two different ways in which the solution may be derived. One is by the use of a set of axioms describing general properties a solution should possess and from which it can be deduced that there is but one possibility in each case. The other proceeds by setting up a model of the negotiation process which the players go through in deciding upon a course of action. This is done in such a way as to obtain a non-cooperative game.

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