An economic approach to the problem of military choice (namely, that of allocating a fixed budget among alternative strategic weapon systems, or of finding the maximum of some relevant measure of strategic airpower, given the limitation of a fixed budget). The complexity of military choice is discussed in terms of criterion selection, values, and intangibles, and in terms of risk and uncertainty about nature, technology, and enemy reactions. As no simple formal model of choice is sufficient for a satisfactory analysis of most real military problems, this paper formulates part of the problems of choice in economic terms, that is, in terms of discovering the most effective uses of limited resources.
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