Allocation of Two Types of Aircraft in Tactical Air War: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Jan 1, 1959
A Game-Theoretic Analysis
|Add to Cart||Paperback27 pages||$15.00||$12.00 20% Web Discount|
An analysis, as a two-sided war game, of the problem of allocating two types of aircraft (bombers and fighters) among three different air tasks (counter air, air defense, and support of ground operations) in a multistrike campaign. It is assumed that a bomber can be used in either the counter-air or ground-support operations, while a fighter can be used in either the air-defense or ground-support roles. That is, bombers and fighters have the one task of ground support in common. Optimal employment during the last strikes of the campaign consists in a concentration of all resources on support of ground operations. Optimal employment during the early strikes of the campaign requires randomization by both sides.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.