Allocation of Two Types of Aircraft in Tactical Air War

A Game-Theoretic Analysis

by Leonard David Berkovitz, Melvin Dresher


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An analysis, as a two-sided war game, of the problem of allocating two types of aircraft (bombers and fighters) among three different air tasks (counter air, air defense, and support of ground operations) in a multistrike campaign. It is assumed that a bomber can be used in either the counter-air or ground-support operations, while a fighter can be used in either the air-defense or ground-support roles. That is, bombers and fighters have the one task of ground support in common. Optimal employment during the last strikes of the campaign consists in a concentration of all resources on support of ground operations. Optimal employment during the early strikes of the campaign requires randomization by both sides.

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