Cover: Incentives and R&D contracting.

Incentives and R&D contracting.

Published 1964

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An examination of the kinds of pressures and motivations that surround the three major participants in the R&D contracting process: the engineer in the government laboratory, the contractor, and the procurement office. It is held that too much importance is attached to the short-run profit-making motivations of a contractor as a source of incentive for efficient conduct of R&D activities.

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