An analysis of the events surrounding the crisis in diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the governments of Israel and Egypt in 1965. The crisis, provoked primarily by West German arms shipments to Israel and by Nasser's reception of Walter Ulbricht as head of state of East Germany, resulted in a diplomatic set-back for Nasser and in gains in prestige and security for Israel. Although Nasser succeeded in forcing West Germany to discontinue its military aid to Israel, he could not prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel. The economic aid commitments that Nasser received from East Germany did not compensate for his loss of West German aid. 80 pp.
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