Clandestine diversion of nuclear material in strategic quantities is impractical and, since alternative methods of acquiring it exist, refinement of safeguard techniques would not solve the problem. Our funds and effort should be directed toward research on halting the spread of nuclear weapons and on convincing countries with limited needs that possession of a few nuclear weapons will not meet their strategic requirements. 7 pp.
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