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National security policy in 1969 requires a "new look" similar to that of 1961 in emphasizing flexible response and in providing guidance for contingencies that American and allied forces can meet, yet with an improved, less abrasive implementing method. To persuade the service bureaucracies to truly consider cost-effectiveness in force planning, the Secretary of Defense might order the Army to redesign its European forces along Soviet lines unless it can produce a more cost-effective design. NATO is inefficient in translating its tremendous resources into relevant fighting capabilities. It is inadequate in conventional capability while possessing vulnerable yet ominous-appearing tactical nuclear weapons. An initial solution is for NATO to align its ground force structure to the more cost-effective Soviet divisional designs. Mutual investments in heavy ABM systems can be avoided by explicit agreements in U.S./Soviet arms control negotiations. To back our nuclear guarantees, we need plans and capabilities for "light" retaliation. (See also P-3959.)

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

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