The prospect for the 1970s is that American policy in the Middle East will be the product of numerous competing forces, among which domestic factors will not necessarily be the primary ones. The influence of interest groups, such as the pro-Israeli organizations and the oil companies, is likely to decline over day-to-day policy. There is a growing feeling throughout the government that the Middle East is not intrinsically vital to U.S. interests, and the post-Vietnam syndrome and the concentration on domestic issues will leave few resources for heavy foreign involvements. Developments in Soviet Middle Eastern policy and in the military capabilities of the Arab states will have a greater impact on U.S. foreign policy than will domestic factors. 27 pp.
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