The Kernel and Bargaining Set for Convex Games.

by M. Maschler, B. Peleg, Lloyd S. Shapley

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Proof that many solution concepts for convex games either coincide with the core or occupy a central position within the core. The proofs of these results are quite elaborate and require lemmas drawn from various topics of game theory. 50 pp. Ref.

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