Analysis of alternative statistical models that assess the causal factors involved in insurgent control in Central Luzon and comparison of several models that incorporate the operations of insurgent organization and socioeconomic variables. All of the formal models indicate that current insurgent control is better explained by the terror and coercion of insurgents than by the socioeconomic status of the population or by antigovernment sentiment. This suggests that if the insurgents are astute and ambitious, the area they control might be substantially extended. It might also be possible for the government to compress that area by moves designed to check insurgent operations. The outcomes in the models depend largely on the relative effectiveness of the Philippine Constabulary and the insurgents and the relative costs they incur.
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