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Compilation of nine papers, three dealing with arms control and nuclear spread and six with defense (and other governmental) decisionmaking. Among the points made in the first three: (1) The cost of acquiring an operational nuclear capability has been underestimated and its strategic importance exaggerated. (2) It is in U.S. interests to limit proliferation, but the principal sufferers from nuclear spread would be the weaker nuclear states and their neighbors. (3) Arms controllers should consider, not abstract rational models, but the real world of political and bureaucratic constraints, limited budgets, long lead times, and sluggishness in changing military postures. (4) They must understand the conflict between the two objectives of (a) reducing superpower armaments, forestalling ABM deployments, etc., and (b) preventing proliferation and maintaining stability in the third world. The papers in the second group cover the uses and limitations of systematic analysis, planning in the face of massive uncertainty, the certainty of change, and centralization/decentralization of military planning and budgeting. (Includes P-3287, 3316, 3393, 3464, 3545, 3557, 3813, 3881, and a Senate committee print.)

This report is part of the RAND Corporation paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.