Prepared for delivery at the International Symposium on Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict, held in Jerusalem, October 12-17, 1975. The paper criticizes the thesis of the indispensability of Soviet participation in the process of arriving at a general settlement of the conflict and considers Soviet participation in the implementing mechanisms of a settlement, in the form of guarantees to the Arabs and Israelis, as dangerous to the stability of the settlement and a prescription for maintaining--if not sharpening--Soviet-American tensions in the Middle East. 11 pp.
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