A discussion of how U.S. defense planners can develop reasonable plans for the use of nuclear weapons and efficient programs for the maintenance of a capable and balanced nuclear arsenal. Points discussed include the massive deterrent concept in U.S. strategy; dangers of the traditional American approach; the Soviet factor and U.S. strategy; and guidelines for developing a U.S. surrogate strategy. The author concludes it would be best to link force and employment planning in the context of a theater-oriented deterrent strategy.
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