The siege mentality in Beirut: an historical analogy between the British in Palestine and the Americans in Lebanon
Purchase Print Copy
|Add to Cart||Paperback4 pages||$20.00||$16.00 20% Web Discount|
This paper recounts experiences of the British Army in 1947 in Palestine, where they were, like the U.S. Marines during 1983 in Lebanon, deployed in urban areas and subjected to hit-and-run attacks by an anonymous adversary. The response of the British then to repeated attacks, like that proposed in Washington in 1983, was to increase fortifications. The author suggests that the British experience is relevant for the U.S. Marines in Lebanon: Determined adversaries are likely to find a way to undermine the defenses of what may be regarded as even the most impregnable installation.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.