This paper was originally prepared for a Conference on Soviet Military Policy, held at Columbia University, New York, on April 13-14, 1984. It considers the relationship between Soviet strategic doctrine and force posture, and how they might be affected by the weapons acquisition process. The author discusses the sources of our information about Soviet weapons acquisition, and suggests that analysts have gradually been able to piece together a general pattern of Soviet weapons design.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.