The Rust incident of 1987 highlighted training deficiencies of the Soviet Air Defense Force and produced a new Air Defense Force commander, General of the Army Ivan Tret'yak. General Tret'yak has introduced a new realism into training and a new openness in admitting failure and difficulties. At the same time, the long-term competence of the organization can only be guaranteed by acquiring high-quality conscripts and officer cadets and training them to high standards. The greatest problem may be the acquisition of these personnel as competition grows for Russian-speaking Slavs with acceptable educational backgrounds--the same people sought by newly emerging sectors of the Soviet economy. Flaws in the current training and personnel assignment systems further inhibit effective education of the officer and support personnel, compounding the difficulties of achieving and sustaining competence.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation Paper series. The paper was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.