Regional dynamics of the Gulf Crisis
ResearchPublished 1991
ResearchPublished 1991
The war in the Persian Gulf is among the most significant political and military events of the twentieth century. In its aftermath, we will see profound changes in the balance of power in the Middle East, as well as changes in attitudes on the part of both governments and their populations. We will also see changes in alliances, both within the region and between the countries of the Middle East and the United States. This paper discusses the personal, political, and economic reasons for Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the historical events that led to the crisis, the attitudes of the Middle Eastern governments that made possible the U.S.-led alliance against Hussein, and the problems and concerns in the Arab world that existed before the crisis, that will remain after the conflict, and that must be resolved if a true and lasting peace is to be achieved.
This publication is part of the RAND paper series. The paper series was a product of RAND from 1948 to 2003 that captured speeches, memorials, and derivative research, usually prepared on authors' own time and meant to be the scholarly or scientific contribution of individual authors to their professional fields. Papers were less formal than reports and did not require rigorous peer review.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.