Game Theory in Economics

Chapter 3, The Rules of the Game

Lloyd S. Shapley, Martin Shubik

ResearchPublished 1972

An overview of the concepts, methods, and formal models that are used in game theory to describe the possible courses of action in a multiperson competitive situation. Among the topics considered are the extensive and strategic forms of a game; Kuhn trees; information sets; pure, mixed, and behavior strategies; recurrent positions; stochastic games; duels; differential games; matrix representations; games on the square; and nonnumerical payoffs. This chapter includes many simple examples and an extensive bibliography.

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Shapley, Lloyd S. and Martin Shubik, Game Theory in Economics: Chapter 3, The Rules of the Game. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R0904z3.html.
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