This report assesses the prospects for the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) formed by the Pakistan-based mujahedin leaders in February 1989 after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It focuses on the following issues: (1) whether the AIG is an asset, a liability, or of no importance in the conflict between the mujahedin and the Kabul regime; (2) the attitude of key commanders, the Afghan leaders based in Pakistan, and other noted Afghans toward the AIG; (3) the prospects for broadening the AIG; (4) the alternatives proposed by the important Afghans — the AIG leaders, resistance commanders, and the former king — on how the AIG should be broadened or replaced; (5) the implications if the AIG is not broadened; and (6) the alternatives to the current AIG.
Khalilzad, Zalmay, Prospects for the Afghan Interim Government. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3949.html. Also available in print form.
Khalilzad, Zalmay, Prospects for the Afghan Interim Government, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, R-3949, 1991. As of October 06, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R3949.html