This report assesses the prospects for the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) formed by the Pakistan-based mujahedin leaders in February 1989 after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. It focuses on the following issues: (1) whether the AIG is an asset, a liability, or of no importance in the conflict between the mujahedin and the Kabul regime; (2) the attitude of key commanders, the Afghan leaders based in Pakistan, and other noted Afghans toward the AIG; (3) the prospects for broadening the AIG; (4) the alternatives proposed by the important Afghans — the AIG leaders, resistance commanders, and the former king — on how the AIG should be broadened or replaced; (5) the implications if the AIG is not broadened; and (6) the alternatives to the current AIG.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation report series. The report was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1993 that represented the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research.
Permission is given to duplicate this electronic document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND Permissions page.
The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.