Conventional models predict that workers consider employment opportunities and monetary rewards expected over their lifetimes when making current period decisions, such as whether to quit a job. This article tests the hypothesis that later career opportunities affect quit decisions by examining the relationship between teaching and school administration. Evidence on the extent to which administrative positions are available to teachers, and the salary premia associated with them, is presented. Discrete time logit-hazard models of teacher quits, estimated using data from New York State, provide some support for the hypothesis, though the magnitudes of the estimated effects are small.
Originally published in: Journal of Labor Economics, v. 14, no. 2, April 1996, pp. 313-339.
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