Hitting America's Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of Deliberate Biological Attacks Against the U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry
May 2, 2004
Although the consequences of an agroterrorism attack are substantial, relatively little attention has been focused on the threat. Unfortunately, the agricultural and food industries are vulnerable to disruption, and the capabilities that terrorists would need for such an attack are not considerable. In the short term and medium term, a series of targeted initiatives could improve the current situation; over the longer term, efforts should be directed toward standardizing and streamlining food-supply and agricultural safety measures within the framework of a single, integrated strategy.
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, potential vulnerabilities in the nation’s critical infrastructure have come under increasing scrutiny. However, compared with the attention focused on such vital “nodes” as transportation and telecommunications, relatively little consideration has been paid to threats to the agriculture and food industries.
A study by RAND researcher Peter Chalk focuses attention on the issue of agroterrorism — the deliberate introduction of a disease agent, either against livestock or into the food chain, to undermine socioeconomic stability and/or generate fear. He lays out the consequences of such an attack, examines key weaknesses inherent in the agricultural sector and the food chain, assesses the capabilities needed to exploit those vulnerabilities, and discusses potential ways to improve agricultural emergency response and management.
A major agroterrorist attack would have substantial economic repercussions, especially when allied industries and services — suppliers, transporters, distributors, and restaurant chains — are taken into account. The fiscal downstream effect of a deliberate act of sabotage would be multidimensional, reverberating through other sectors of the economy and ultimately impacting the consumer.
Aside from economic considerations, a successful bio-assault against the agricultural sector could also undermine the public’s confidence in, and support for, the government. The mechanics of dealing with an attack — especially the potential need for mass animal slaughter to contain a major disease outbreak — could certainly generate public criticism (as it did during the 2001 foot and mouth epidemic in the United Kingdom).
Beyond the immediate economic and political impact, such attacks could also elicit fear and anxiety among the public. This would be particularly true in the event of a public health scare resulting from foodborne outbreaks or the spread of animal pathogens contagious to humans.
Key vulnerabilities in the agricultural sector stem from:
Terrorists can choose from a large menu of bio-agents, most of which are environmentally hardy, are not the focus of concerted livestock vaccination programs, and can be easily smuggled into the country. The food chain offers a low-tech mechanism for achieving human deaths. Many animal pathogens cannot be transmitted to humans, which makes them easier for terrorists to work with. Finally, because livestock are the primary vector for pathogenic transmission, there is no weaponization obstacle to overcome.
Despite the ease and implications of a successful attack, agroterrorism is unlikely to constitute a primary form of terrorist aggression because it lacks a single, highly visible point of focus for the media (a primary consideration in any terrorist attack). However, disrupting the food sector could well emerge as a viable secondary modus operandi to further destabilize an already disoriented society after a conventional terrorist campaign. Being able to use cheap and unsophisticated means to undermine a state’s economic base gives this form of aggression a high cost/benefit payoff that would be very useful to groups faced with overcoming significant power asymmetries.
Short- to medium-term recommendations include the following:
Over the longer term, additional effort should be directed toward standardizing and streamlining food-supply and agricultural safety measures within the framework of a single, integrated strategy that cuts across the missions and capabilities of federal, state, and local agencies. (See the table.)
|Preventative Measures||Response Measures|
|Intelligence measures (identify potential threats; understand motivations; predict behavior)||Early detection of exotic/foreign pathogenic agents|
|Monitoring programs (detect/track specific pathogens/diseases)||Early prediction of disease dispersion patterns|
|Establishment of laboratories to research the most-virulent diseases||Early containment procedures|
|International counterproliferation treaties, protocols, and agreements||Epidemiology and treatment|
|Creation of agent-specific resistance in livestock||Depopulation and carcass disposal|
|Specific vaccination against the most-threatening animal disease agents||Diplomatic/legal/economic/ political responses|
|Modification (where possible) of vulnerable food/agriculture practices||Compensation and indemnity|
|Biosecurity and surveillance||Education and training|
|Education and training (federal, state, and local)||Public awareness and outreach programs|
SOURCE: Most of the above items are from Henry Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat, McNair Paper 65, Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, March 2000, pp. 40–41.
An effort such as this would help to unify the patchwork of largely uncoordinated bio-emergency preparedness and response initiatives that now exist. Integrating agriculture and food safety measures would also reduce jurisdictional conflicts and eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort.