Oct 14, 2004
In today’s heightened security environment, accurate and timely intelligence information is critical. But managing the flood of available data has never been more fraught with challenges. A RAND team has devised a new approach to gathering and interpreting information based on a computer network able to single out warning signs while protecting individual privacy. Atypical situations would be the starting point. The network would detect these suspicious signals and then project them into a realistic context so that analysts could assess whether they really do indicate a possible terrorist attack and initiate any necessary preemptive action.
Effective intelligence gathering plays a vital role in detecting and preventing terrorist attacks. But in the information age, it has become tremendously challenging to identify and understand the signals that could point to plans for an attack. Every day, the intelligence community receives huge amounts of data from many different sources — countless unsystematic “dots” of information. Yet with few clues about which data from this enormous flow are related to possible terrorist activity, great uncertainties about what the data mean, and little indication of how to put all the information together, the community can easily miss critical warning signs.
With a mandate to design new ways to “connect the dots” in intelligence, a team from the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD) has created a concept for an analytic tool that can improve the ability to identify terrorist-related data and comprehend links among them. The results of the study are documented in Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior.
The new concept is based on the idea of studying the atypical — out-of-the-ordinary signals that deviate significantly from an established status quo. It envisions a network of computers that can handle a flow of data far too large for analysts to work with directly. The network would take in streams of raw data, filter them to extract information that could be related to terrorist activity, and then test the information to identify observations that truly indicate a serious threat. By prioritizing information in this way, the network would help human analysts focus on the most relevant and important discoveries.
In the past, the intelligence community searched for threats to homeland security by harvesting large amounts of data from sources worldwide. Computers and analysts then filtered the data for individual “nuggets” that fit preestablished patterns of suspicious behavior. This approach worked both because the volume of data to process was comparatively limited and the adversaries were large, not very agile, and typically attacked in similar ways.
In today’s dramatically changed security environment, however, new realities undermine the traditional approach. The volume and scope of available data far exceed the ability of conventional approaches to process the information directly. The nature of the adversaries has also changed: They are smaller and more scattered than in the past — and much more elusive. Nor will they necessarily attack the same way twice. Consequently, looking for established patterns of suspicious behavior can actually be counterproductive. Finally, in the era of electronic databases, approaches centered on collecting and storing all available data on individuals have raised serious privacy concerns.
To meet current security demands, the NSRD team departed from traditional thinking about intelligence analysis, turning instead to a process used by history’s highly astute problem-solvers, such as the fictional Sherlock Holmes. This process locates suspicious behavior not in established patterns, but in out-of-the-ordinary situations. Problem-solvers first establish expectations for what is “normal” in a given situation. They then closely observe the situation for behavior that deviates significantly from the status quo. When they see a “flag,” solvers search for additional data to confirm that the behavior is not only truly unusual but also real cause for concern. They next seek to understand the meaning of the behavior, first searching for related information that enables them to put that behavior in context and then testing hypotheses about what the deviations suggest. In the final stage of the process, the solvers act upon all they have learned. For Sherlock Holmes, this would involve naming the culprit. In a situation such as a terrorist attack, it would entail taking preemptive action to eliminate or minimize the risk.
Drawing on this problem-solving process, the NSRD team created the Atypical Signal Analysis and Processing (ASAP) concept. This concept calls for a powerful tool that would use this method to sift through vast quantities of data and evaluate different ways of understanding suspicious information. Fresh discoveries about harvested information would be continuously incorporated into interpretations of what it means.
The tool envisaged within the ASAP concept is a computer network that would use a wide variety of “agents” — software applications that perform a specific function on data they receive as inputs — to collect, link, and analyze “dots” of intelligence information. These agents would move data through a series of steps (see the figure).
At the same time as data are moving through this sequence of steps, the output of every step becomes an additional data point for the network to analyze, feeding back into the process at the early “detection” stage. This allows the flows through the ASAP network to be iterative and multidirectional — continually adapting to the most recent results. For example, an ASAP network might evaluate whether certain linked “dots” would be more significant if considered as a complete set rather than individually. If that were the case, the entire set would flow back into the network as a new data point. A network control function (the oval in the figure) manages these multidirectional flows, filtering the results of each step and determining what steps to take next.
The ASAP network would work with only a restricted set of data. Data streams initially flowing into the system would consist solely of existing intelligence and homeland security information. Personal records would be introduced only if suspicion were great enough to subpoena that information under existing U.S. legal and law-enforcement statutes. Algorithms built into the network, along with judicial review of any request to subpoena personal records, would ensure that those statutes were being followed.
Fully implementing the ASAP concept would involve an extensive three-phase research effort. In phase 1, researchers would develop an architectural blueprint for the network and a scenario to test the architecture. During phase 2, researchers would create design specifications for the software agents. In phase 3, a prototype network would be built.
In the meantime, certain initial steps could be taken:
Implementing these stopgap measures would enable human analysts to link “dots” more effectively until an automated ASAP network became fully functional.