The model here presented investigates the advisability of reconnaissance before a single bombing mission on a single target, whose military worth is not known exactly. The effect of successful reconnaissance is to avoid the waste of committing a large force against a worthless target, and the lost opportunity of sending too small a force to a valuable target. The uncertainty regarding the worth of the target may be thought of as arising, for example, from the unknown or partially known results of earlier strikes on the same target.
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