Reconnaissance in Game Theory
ResearchPublished 1949
The present report is restricted to the case where one player uses a fixed type of reconnaissance, and where the second player attempts neither reconnaissance on his own nor counter measure. The influence of the reconnaissance on the strategies of the players and on the value of the game is studied.
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Document Details
- Copyright: RAND Corporation
- Availability: Web-Only
- Year: 1949
- Pages: 19
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.7249/RM208
- Document Number: RM-208
Citation
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Bohnenblust, H. F., Lloyd S. Shapley, and Seymour Sherman, Reconnaissance in Game Theory, RAND Corporation, RM-208, 1949. As of September 23, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM208.html
Bohnenblust, H. F., Lloyd S. Shapley, and Seymour Sherman, Reconnaissance in Game Theory. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1949. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM208.html.
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