Another in a series of studies concerned with the general theory of air strategy in a nuclear age. The present study deals with some of the peculiar and historically novel requirements of a deterrence posture. The argument presented is that modern deterrence is like traditional deterrence in some respects, but differs in that today deterrence of total war is considered a policy that must go permanently unchallenged. A deterrence strategy diverges significantly from a strategy which emphasizes ability to win if war comes. (Also published as P-1405.)
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