A game solution to the problem of scheduling missile launchings from bases that may come under enemy attack. Both sides, Blue and Red, know each other's initial missile strength at the outbreak of atomic war between the two countries. Blue wants to maximize and Red wants to minimize the expected number of successful Blue launchings. The problem is solved first for the case of a single launching site and then for a generalization to any number of sites. It is assumed that Blue must launch his missiles within a certain time period after the outbreak of war, that each Blue site can launch only one missile at a time, and that any Blue missile being launched will be destroyed if a Red missile hits near the launch site.
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