Part of a broader investigation to provide a mathematical method of predicting the behavior of large groups of people. Institutions with large numbers of competing participants are common in political and economic life (e.g., markets, exchanges, corporations, presidential nominating conventions, and legislatures). These institutions can be considered as n-person games. However, game theory has not yet been able to designate the fundamental principles of "mass competition" to help explain how the institutions operate in practice. This memorandum discusses the "oceanic" theory of voting games in which a large fraction of the total vote is controlled by a few people.
This report is part of the RAND Corporation research memorandum series. The Research Memorandum was a product of the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1973 that represented working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.
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