Values of Large Games - VII

A General Exchange Economy with Money

by Lloyd S. Shapley


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An application of the mathematical theory of games to a central problem in theoretical economics. It is shown that the "Shapley value" solution of a certain general class of competitive markets, regarded as multiperson games, converges to the classical "competitive equilibrium" solution when the set of traders in the market is expanded homogeneously. (See also RM-2648, RM-2649, RM-2650, RM-2651, RM-2860, RM-3158.)

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