Military Procurement and Contracting
An Economic Analysis
ResearchPublished 1962
An Economic Analysis
ResearchPublished 1962
A survey of problems of economic efficiency in military procurement and contracting. The author makes some specific suggestions for improvements and discusses certain problems that require further study. Background material on contracts is presented. The increasing share of procurement represented by cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts is noted and a reclassification of contract types is proposed. The principal change suggested is the establishment of efficiency classes in incentive contracts so that a "hard" cost target can be set. Cost underruns could then more nearly represent truly efficient behavior and not simply be the result of poor cost estimating.
This publication is part of the RAND research memorandum series. The research memorandum series, a product of RAND from 1948 to 1973, included working papers meant to report current results of RAND research to appropriate audiences.
This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.
RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.