An examination of a classical formulation of the marketplace from three different theoretical viewpoints. The first model supposes all individuals to be price-takers, acting in isolation to maximize their private utility; the result is the "competitive equilibrium," or Walras solution. The second model is a fully cooperative game, with no restrictions on communication, negotiation, or collusion; the result is the "core," or Edgeworth solution. The third is an asymmetric, noncooperative game, in which half the players (e.g., the consumers) are passive price-takers, while the others have strategic freedom to exploit this passivity, individually but not collusively. The "equilibrium point" of this game corresponds to the oligopolistic solution of Cournot.
Shapley, Lloyd S. and Martin Shubik, Concepts and Theories of Pure Competition. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1963. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM3553.html. Also available in print form.
Shapley, Lloyd S. and Martin Shubik, Concepts and Theories of Pure Competition, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RM-3553-PR, 1963. As of July 28, 2021: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM3553.html